

# Zombie Lending in the United States: Prevalence versus Relevance

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# Current Policy Concerns

Laeven et al. (2020); Schivardi et al. (2020):

COVID-19 policy interventions as a lifeline for non-viable firms?



If the answer is “YES”:

What are the Economic Consequences?

# The “Zombie”-Narrative

## Zombification / Zombie-Lending

- Productivity ↓ Caballero et al. (2008), McGowan et al. (2018), Acharya et al. (2020)
- Misallocation of Resources ↑ Caballero et al. (2008), McGowan et al. (2018), Acharya et al. (2020)
- Investment ↓ Hallak et al. (2018), Acharya et al. (2020)
- Business Dynamism ↓ Hallak et al. (2018), Acharya et al. (2019), Acharya et al. (2020)
- Monetary Policy Efficacy ↓ Acharya et al. (2020)

## Related Literature

- **Japan:** Caballero et al. (2008)
- **Europe:** McGowan et al. (2018), Andrews and Petroulakis (2019), Acharya et al. (2019), Acharya et al. (2020), Acharya et al. (2021)
- **Italy:** Schivardi et al. (2021)
- **World-wide:** Banerjee and Hofmann (2018), Banerjee and Hofmann (2020)
- **United States:** Favara et al. (2022)

# Goal of the Paper

## Zombification / Zombie-Lending in the U.S.

Prevalence



On Aggregate:  
Not widespread  
(see: Favara et al. (2022))

Relevance



???

# Data

- **Balance Sheet:** Compustat
- **Debt Structure:** Standard & Poor's Capital IQ
  - Bank credit (BC)
  - Bonds & Notes (BN)
- **Time:** Annual; 2002 - 2019
- **Industries:** NAICS (2-digit)  
→ Excluded: 11, 22, 52, 81, 92

# Classifying Zombies (I)

## No uniform Definition

### Broad Definition

McGowan et al. (2018), Andrews and Petroulakis (2019), Banerjee and Hofmann (2018)

- I)  $ICR_{i,t-2:t} \equiv \frac{XINT_{i,t-2:t}}{EBITDA_{i,t-2:t}} > 1$   
 II)  $Age_{i,t} \geq 10$

### Narrow Definition

Banerjee and Hofmann (2018)

- I)  $ICR_{i,t-2:t} \equiv \frac{XINT_{i,t-2:t}}{EBITDA_{i,t-2:t}} > 1$   
 II)  $Age_{i,t} \geq 10$   
 III)  $tq_{i,s,t} < \widetilde{TQ}_{s,t}$   
 $\rightarrow \widetilde{TQ}_{s,t}$ : median Tobin's Q in industry  $s$

Bargagli Stoffs et al. (2020)


Positive correlation between firm default and non-reporting of financial information.

# Classifying Zombies (III)

Extension of **Narrow Definition**:

$$\text{III) } tq_{i,s,t} < \widetilde{TQ}_{s,t} \quad \text{OR} \quad tq_{i,s,t} = NA$$

Figure 1: Zombie Prevalence under Different Zombie-Definitions



Notes: Shaded areas mark NBER recessions.

# Zombie-Lending (I)

Variables of Interest:

**New / fresh** bank-credit or bonds & notes


**Table 1:** Debt Obligations by Maturities – Full Sample: 2002-2019

	Bank/Term Loans	Revolving Credit Facility	Bonds and Notes
	Total Obs.	Total Obs.	Total Obs.
$1Q \leq m \leq 4Q$	13,687	16,665	31,751
$5Q \leq m \leq 8Q$	9,569	12,221	26,277
$9Q \leq m \leq 20Q$	28,035	32,255	68,250
$21Q \leq m \leq 40Q$	16,645	15,858	68,491
$41Q \leq m \leq 100Q$	3,881	2,212	31,603
$101Q \leq m \leq 120Q$	304	72	11,837
$121Q \leq m \leq 200Q$	179	13	2,464


Notes: We show the number of newly reported debt obligations in company filings in Compustat's Capital-IQ database in the years 2002-2019 by their respective maturity upon origination.

# Zombie-Lending (II)


Figure 2: Share of Newly Granted Credit Sunk with Zombies




(a)  $1Q \leq m \leq 4Q$



(b)  $5Q \leq m \leq 8Q$



(c)  $9Q \leq m \leq 20Q$



(d)  $21Q \leq m \leq 40Q$

# Summary - So Far (I)

## Zombification / Zombie-Lending in the U.S.

Prevalence



Figures 1 & 2:  
Not widespread



In Agreement with Favara et al. (2022).

Relevance



???

# Industry-Share of Zombie-Credit

*Zombie – Credit – Share<sub>s,t</sub>*:

Share of newly granted credit to industry  $s$  that sits with zombies

$$\text{Zombie – Credit – Share}_{s,t} = \frac{\sum_{i \in s} \text{Credit}_{i,t}^Z}{\sum_{i \in s} \text{Credit}_{i,t}^Z + \text{Credit}_{i,t}^{NZ}}$$

where

- $\text{Credit}_{i,t}^Z$ : Amount of credit granted to zombie  $i$  in year  $t$
- $\text{Credit}_{i,t}^{NZ}$ : Amount of credit granted to non-zombie  $i$  in year  $t$
- $\text{Credit}_{i,t}$ : Bank-credit ( $BC_{i,t}$ ) or Bonds & Notes ( $BN_{i,t}$ )

# Zombie-Lending & Non-Zombie Performance (I)

Total-Factor-Productivity ( $TFP_{i,t}$ )

$$TFP_{i,t} = \mathbb{X} + \beta_{BC} NZ_{i,t-1} \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z + \beta_{BN} NZ_{i,t-1} \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

Capital Growth ( $\Delta \log(K_{i,t})$ )

$$\Delta \log(K_{i,t}) = \mathbb{X} + \beta_{BC} NZ_{i,t-1} \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z + \beta_{BN} NZ_{i,t-1} \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

Employment Growth ( $\Delta EMP_{i,t}$ )

$$\Delta EMP_{i,t} = \mathbb{X} + \beta_{BC} NZ_{i,t-1} \times \Delta \log(BC_{s,t}^Z) + \beta_{BN} NZ_{i,t-1} \times \Delta \log(BN_{s,t}^Z) + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (3)$$

# Zombie-Lending & Non-Zombie Performance (II)

Figure 4: Zombie-Lending & Non-Zombie Performance

Maturity ( $m$ )	1Q $\leq m \leq$ 4Q	1Q $\leq m \leq$ 4Q	1Q $\leq m \leq$ 4Q
Variables	(1) $TFP_{i,t}$	(2) $\Delta \log(K_{i,t})$	(3) $\Delta EMP_{i,t}$
$NZ_{i,t-1}$	-0.003	0.194***	7.768***
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$	-0.085	-0.251	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$	0.177	0.107	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times \Delta \log(BC_{s,t}^Z)$			-0.293
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times \Delta \log(BN_{s,t}^Z)$			-0.241
Years		2002 - 2019	
Observations	39,287	69,229	41,897
Firms	5,643	9,422	7,313
Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Controls	X	X	X
Within- $R^2$	0.03	0.12	0.06

Notes: For better visualization, coefficients of Model (3) are multiplied by a factor of  $10^2$ .

Each estimation includes firm-, industry-, year- and -industry-year-fixed effects.

Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.

Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

## Summary - So Far (II)

### Zombification / Zombie-Lending in the U.S.

#### Prevalence



Figures 1 & 2:  
Not widespread



In Agreement with Favara et al. (2022).

#### Relevance



Table 4:  
Not at all, **BUT...**

# Fundamentals: Zombies vs Non-Zombies

Table 2: Summary Statistics – Full Sample: 2002-2019


	Median		Units
	$Z^{NAR}$	<i>Non – Zombies</i>	
TFP	0.10	0.10	
Assets	0.03	0.20	Bill. USD
(Book) Leverage	0.13	0.22	
ROA	-0.18	0.01	
Asset Tangibility	0.08	0.15	
CapX / Assets	0.01	0.03	
Value Added	-0.46	51.34	Mill. USD
Employees	0.10	0.82	( $\times 10^3$ )

Notes: For each year in the sample, we first compute the cross-sectional median, and then compute the each time-series' average for each metric.

# Focus: Small & Medium-Sized Companies

**Small- & Medium-Sized (Chodorow-Reich, 2013):**  
Employees < 1,000

Figure 5: Share of Small & Medium-Sized Companies



# Zombie-Lending & Non-Zombie Performance (III)

Figure 6: Total Factor Productivity & Zombie-Lending

Maturity ( $m$ )	1Q $\leq m \leq$ 4Q	1Q $\leq m \leq$ 4Q	1Q $\leq m \leq$ 4Q
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables	$TFP_{i,t}$	$TFP_{i,t}$	$TFP_{i,t}$
$NZ_{i,t-1}$	0.013	0.053	0.050
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1}$	-0.14		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$	0.075		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$	-0.539***		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i$		-0.023	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i$		-0.019	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$		-0.510*	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$		-0.887*	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times no.bond_i$			-0.028
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i$			-0.017
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times no.bond_i \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$			-1.026**
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$			-0.926*
Years		2002 - 2019	
Observations	36,899	22,286	22,286
Firms	5,308	2,616	2,616
Within- $R^2$	0.03	0.04	0.04

Notes: Each estimation includes firm-, industry-, year- and -industry-year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Zombie-Lending & Non-Zombie Performance (III)

Figure 6: Total Factor Productivity & Zombie-Lending

Maturity ( $m$ )	1Q ≤ $m$ ≤ 4Q	1Q ≤ $m$ ≤ 4Q	1Q ≤ $m$ ≤ 4Q
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables	$TFP_{i,t}$	$TFP_{i,t}$	$TFP_{i,t}$
$NZ_{i,t-1}$	0.013	0.053	0.050
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1}$	-0.14		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$	0.075		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$	-0.539***		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i$		-0.023	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i$		-0.019	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$		-0.510*	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$		-0.887*	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times no.bond_i$			-0.028
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i$			-0.017
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times no.bond_i \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$			-1.026**
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$			-0.926*
Years		2002 - 2019	
Observations	36,899	22,286	22,286
Firms	5,308	2,616	2,616
Within- $R^2$	0.03	0.04	0.04

Median TFP:

-34%

Median TFP:

-84.5%

Notes: Each estimation includes firm-, industry-, year- and -industry-year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Zombie-Lending & Non-Zombie Performance (IV)

Figure 7: Capital Growth & Zombie-Lending

Maturity ( $m$ )	$5Q \leq m \leq 40Q$	$5Q \leq m \leq 40Q$	$5Q \leq m \leq 40Q$
Variables	$\Delta \log(K_{i,t})$	$\Delta \log(K_{i,t})$	$\Delta \log(K_{i,t})$
$NZ_{i,t-1}$	0.203***	0.180***	0.173***
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1}$	-0.013		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$	-0.178		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$	0.153		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i$		-0.028	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i$		-0.000	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$		-0.213	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$		-0.815***	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times no.bond_i$			-0.047
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i$			0.567*
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times no.bond_i \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$			0.003
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$			-0.817**
Years		2002 - 2019	
Observations	63,498	53,092	53,092
Firms	8,642	6,360	6,360
Within- $R^2$	0.12	0.12	0.12

Capital Growth:  
-3.25%

Notes: Each estimation includes firm-, industry-, year- and -industry-year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Zombie-Lending & Non-Zombie Performance (V)

Figure 8: Employment Growth & Zombie-Lending

Maturity ( $m$ )	1Q ≤ $m$ ≤ 4Q	1Q ≤ $m$ ≤ 4Q	1Q ≤ $m$ ≤ 4Q
Variables	(1) $\Delta EMP_{i,t}$	(2) $\Delta EMP_{i,t}$	(3) $\Delta EMP_{i,t}$
$NZ_{i,t-1}$	1.356	2.845	4.966***
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1}$	7.418***		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times \Delta \log(BC_{s,t}^Z)$	-0.186*		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times \Delta \log(BN_{s,t}^Z)$	-0.033		
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i$		7.395***	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i$		6.000***	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times \Delta \log(BC_{s,t}^Z)$		-0.329*	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i \times \Delta \log(BN_{s,t}^Z)$		-0.078	
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times no.bond_i$			7.945***
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i$			4.714**
$NZ_{i,t} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times bank.dep_i \times no.bond_i \times \Delta \log(BC_{s,t}^Z)$			-0.415*
$NZ_{i,t-1} \times SM_{i,t-1} \times CapM.dep_i \times \Delta \log(BN_{s,t}^Z)$			-0.078
Years	2002-2019	2002-2019	2002-2019
Observations	41,897	25,357	25,357
Firms	7,313	3,725	3,725
Within- $R^2$	0.06	0.07	0.07

Employment Growth:  
-0.6% - -1.3%

Notes: For better visualization, coefficients are multiplied by a factor of  $10^2$ .

Each estimation includes firm-, industry-, year- and -industry-year-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.

Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Zombie-Lending & Business Dynamism

Figure 9: Zombie-Lending & Business Dynamism

Maturity ( $m$ )	1Q $\leq m \leq$ 4Q	5Q $\leq m \leq$ 40Q
	(1)	(2)
Variables	$\frac{NB_{s,t}}{N_{s,t}}$	$\frac{NB_{s,t}}{N_{s,t}}$
$BC_{s,t-1}^Z$	0.005	-0.031**
$BN_{s,t-1}^Z$	-0.005	-0.021
$bank.dep_{s,t-1} \times BC_{s,t-1}^Z$	-0.023**	-0.013
$CapM.dep_{s,t-1} \times BN_{s,t-1}^Z$	0.022	0.030
Years	2002-2019	2002-2019
Observations	309	320
Industries	18	18

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

# Conclusion

## Zombification / Zombie-Lending in the U.S.

Prevalence



Not widespread



In Agreement with Favara et al.  
(2022).

Relevance



No one-size-fits all answer

Size  
Bank-Dependency  
Access to Capital-Markets

# References I

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## References II


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# Zombies in Portugal (I)

Bureau van Dijk - Amadeus


Zombie-Definition: McGowan et al. (2018)

Figure 10: Number of Firms & Zombie-Share




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 11: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 12: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 13: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 14: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 15: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 16: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 17: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 18: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 19: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 20: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 21: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 22: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code




## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 23: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code



## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 24: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code



## Zombies in Portugal (II)

Figure 25: Zombie-Share by 4-Digit Zip-Code

